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Nearly thirty-five years ago Donald Schön proposed 
an epistemology of design practice as an antidote to 
the crisis of legitimacy in architecture and other pro-
fessional design disciplines. His theory of reflective 
practice is popular in teacher and nursing education 
programs and ‘design-thinking’ has gained credibil-
ity to promote innovation in business. Yet he failed 
to provide the epistemic credibility for architectural 
practice he promised. This critical analysis compares 
constructs in Schön’s theory against knowledge from 
mind and brain science to assess their validity and 
limitations. Findings inform suggestions for extending 
his theory toward developing a more complete episte-
mology of architectural practice.
Situated Design-Thinking  
in Architectural Practice:
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1 - Schön, Simon, 
and others suggest 
design encompass-
es “all occupa-
tions engaged in 
converting actual 
to preferred situa-
tions” (Schön, 1983, 
p. 77).
1. Introduction
The 1980’s saw emergence of a new research stream: 
empirical study of design cognition as a way-of-know-
ing distinct from science or humanities (Cross, 2007). 
Central to this effort was Donald Schön’s (1983), The 
Reflective Practitioner, which challenged Simon’s 
(1996 [1969]) “Technical Rationality” suggesting 
design be made more rigorous “by the application 
of scientific theory and method” (ivi, p. 21). Through 
ethnographic study of architects (and also engineers, 
town planners, managers, and psychotherapists), 
Schön described physically and socially situated 
processes of design-thinking1. He focused attention 
to lived experiences of professionals in-action solving 
ill-defined problems – illuminating tacit knowledge 
and artistry (improvisation) in their practices. Impor-
tantly, Schön positioned design-thinking as expertise 
acquired through practice and worthy of empirical 
examination.
Today benefits of design-thinking to drive organi-
zational innovation are embraced by corporations 
(Johansson-Sköldberg et al., 2013), yet architects con-
tinue to suffer inability to sufficiently communicate 
their legitimacy and worth (Cohen et al., 2005). This is 
due, in part, to the growing complexity of architectur-
al practice – where buildings contribute to the larger 
environmental and socio-cultural ecosystem – and 
challenges architects face in explaining or quantifying 
their intuitive design processes for clients (Cohen et 
al., 2005; Schön, 1983, pp. 3-20). Given demands for 
increased rigor in architectural practice to improve 
building outcomes, the value of design as a discipline 
continues to be called into question. Architects implic-
itly understand and appreciate advantages of design-
erly over other ways of knowing, but benefits are not 
always salient to clients and users. Despite decades 
of design cognition research, architecture still lacks 
epistemic evidence to sufficiently convey its worth to 
the non-designerly world. 
Schön (1983) proposed “Reflective Practice” as “an 
epistemology of practice implicit in the artistic, 
intuitive processes which some practitioners… bring 
to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, 
and value conflict” (ivi: 48). His theory has been 
highly influential in education, healthcare and man-
agement professions and today knowing-in-action, 
Today benefits 
of design-












Fig. 1 - Simon’s Ratio-
nal Decision-Making 
(IDC) Model.
reflection-in-action, and reflection-on-action yield 
48,100,000, 34,500,000, and 147,000,000 Google results, 
respectively. Despite widespread application and pop-
ularity, researchers criticize Schön’s theory for:
• Lack of clarity/vague constructs (Eraut, 2004; 
 Webster, 2008)
• Problems of implementation (Ekebergh, 2007)
• Ignoring socio-political context (Boud and Walker, 
2002; Webster, 2008)
This paper examines Schön’s thesis by critically an-
alyzing his findings with respect to knowledge from 
mind and brain science. The aims of this effort are 
threefold: 
1. Evaluate construct validity by comparing Schön’s 
knowing-in-action, reflection-in-action, reflec-
tion-on-action, artistry, and knowing-in-practice 
against theories of situated cognition.
2. Assess criticisms of Reflected Practice Theory as 
listed above with respect to construct validity anal-
ysis. 
3. Recommend how Reflective Practice might be 
extended to provide a more fully developed episte-
mology of architectural practice.
2 . Reflective practice constructs
Schön (1983) proposed Reflective Practice theory to 
lend credibility to experience as a form of intuitive 
knowing in-situ, distinct from (and superior to) the 
linear, rationalist approach advocated by others (ivi, 
pp. 21-69) – for example, Simon’s IDC model (Fig. 1). 
2.1. Modes of design-thinking 
Basing his argument on ethnographic data drawn 
from working practices of engineers, architects, town 
planners, psychotherapists, and business managers, 







its worth to the 
non-designerly 
world.
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Architects engaged 




Schön found practitioners engaged in three cognitive 
processes while solving ill-defined, complex problems: 
1. Knowing-in-action: intuitive performance devel-
oped through practice (p. 54).
2. Reflection-in-action: critical thinking occurring 
within the scope of a problem-solving activity (e.g., 
design project), often triggered by an unanticipat-
ed situation (p. 56).
3. Reflection-on-action, evaluation of a project or pro-
cess after completion (p. 61). 
2.1.1 Action present
Knowing-in-action and reflection-in-action are com-
plementary processes, together forming an iterative 
approach toward managing complexity in ill-defined 
problems. Knowing-in-action is the physical expres-
sion of intuitive ‘knowing in practice’ (knowing-how). 
It reveals that “competent practitioners usually know 
more than they can say” (p. viii). Reflection-in-action 
is the explicit thinking complement (knowing-that) to 
knowing-in-action’s doing. It describes how people 
recognize what they know in the consequences of 
their moves – and that their knowledge may be deeper 
than what they could articulate ahead of time. “Doing 
extends thinking in the tests, moves and probes of 
experimental action and reflections feeds on doing and 
its results… each sets boundaries for the other” (p. 280). 
Through these two processes, the designer constructs 
the problem space by developing “an understanding 
of the situation” (p. 129). Schön used the term action to 
reference physically-situated ways people incorporate 
their bodies and environments (e.g., tools, materials, 
and other people) into their design-thinking systems. 
He also used action to define the scope of a design 
project; action present (p. 278) is the time-period when 
a designer’s action still affects the outcome of design 
project (p. 62). Knowing-in-action and reflection-in-ac-
tion occur during action present, defining the concep-
tual problem space for a project or process (Fig. 2).
2.1.2. Learning from design cases
Reflection-on-action happens outside of a project 
scope. It is a process of rationalization postmortem 
involving critique of previous decisions and behav-
iors affecting solution outcomes. This is reflection for 







problem space for a 
project or process.
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case-based learning. Reflective practice emphasizes 
the uniqueness of design cases, however reflec-
tion-on-action is self-reflexive, metacognition by 
which a practitioner learns concepts, ideas, or skills 
that are transferable to other cases. Per Schön, ‘We re-
flect on action, thinking back on what we have done…
to discover how our knowing-in-action may have con-
tributed to an unexpected outcome’ (p. 26). Designers 
bring different perspectives to their work, including 
“values, goals, purposes, and interests” (p. 17) implicit 
in their knowing-in-action. Critical reflection-on-ac-
tion identifies and resolves conflicts between implicit 
and explicit theories; it is common for actions (guided 
by theory-in-use) to be inconsistent with stated goals or 
intentions (espoused theory). Reflection-on-action sur-
faces similarities and differences between espoused 
theory and theory-in-use when practitioners compare 
what actually happened during a project with beliefs 
about the design. Tension arising from theory differ-
ences promotes new insights and learning, evolving 
design-rationale, expertise and professional growth. 
2.2 Design-Thinking Expertise: Inquiry, Reflection, 
Reframing
2.2.1. Artistry through frame experimentation
Schön argued that design’s ‘crisis of confidence’ 
arises from inability practitioners have in explaining 
expertise (knowing-in-practice) – “making sense of 
uncertainty, performing artistically, setting prob-
Fig. 2 - Schön’s 
Reflective Practice.










reflecting on the 
case postmortem.
lems” – when such processes are not considered 
“invariant, known, and teachable” (pp. 18-20). De-
sign-thinking differs from rational problem-solving 
because its goal is to find ‘the right problem,’ not solve 
a given problem. The designer problem-finds through 
artistry – improvisational exploration of the problem 
space using frame experimentation: iterating inquiry, 
reflection, and problem framing/reframing. Frame 
experimentation, Schön reasoned, gives rigor to reflec-
tion-in-action employing strategies similar to scientific 
research, but particular to design practice (pp. 68-69). 
2.2.2. Specialization and intuitive knowledge
Designers treat each design case uniquely, constructing 
knowledge through frame experimentation and devel-
oping expertise by reflecting on the case postmortem. 
With practice, a designer “encounters certain types of 
situations again and again”, and becomes a specialist, 
developing “a repertoire of expectations, images, and 
techniques” (p. 60). A growing repertoire helps the 
designer better predict outcomes of actions. Less often 
surprised, her knowing-in-practice becomes increas-
ingly intuitive and harder to explain. Specialization 
also brings fewer opportunities for reflection, increas-
ing risk the designer develops “patterns of error” and 
“parochial narrowness of vision” (pp. 60-61). 
3. Design thinking-in-action: embodied, embedded, 
enactive, predictive
Although published decades ago, Schön’s (1983) Reflec-
tive Practice theory describes the physically-situated2 
nature of design-thinking. Today, scientists generally 
agree human cognition is both socially and physical-
ly situated (Anderson, 2003; Robbins, Aydede, 2009), 
meaning people’s knowledge cannot be separated 
from the socio-physical contexts where they develope 
and use it. Neuroscience research also suggests the 
mind is a sophisticated hypothesis-testing system. 
Supported by neurophysiological evidence, Predictive 
Mind theory describes brain function as a ‘prediction 
machine’ that continuously tries to match internally 
driven (top-down) expectations with externally driven 
(bottom-up) multi-sensory experiences in the envi-
ronment (Clark, 2015). Schön’s concepts of know-
ing-in-action, reflection-in-action, and artistry suggest 
both physical grounding of cognition and predictive 
processing in design-thinking.
2 - John Dewey laid 
theoretical ground-
work for situation 
cognition (Galla-














3.1. The Brain-Body-Environment Cognitive System
Situated cognition integrates theories from social 
psychology, ecological psychology, and biology to 
describe human cognition as dependent upon bodily 
characteristics, intellectual abilities, mood, activities, 
socio-cultural context, and physical environment (Gal-
lagher, 2009). Three tenets (3E’s) take physical ground-
ing as their focus: embodied, embedded, and enactive 
cognition. Embodied cognition explains how human 
perception is shaped by the characteristics and capa-
bilities of the body (Gibson, 1977; Varela et al., 1991). 
Embedded cognition considers ways people exploit 
features of their physical (Clark, 2008) and social 
(Hutchins, 1995) environments to improve cognitive 
capabilities. Enactive cognition theorizes knowledge 
is constituted through a person’s actions in, and inter-
actions with, their environment (Thompson, Varela, 
2001). Central to each of these tenets is belief that 
action and perception are coupled, an idea supported 
by neurophysiology research on neural processing of 
vision and hearing3 and the brain’s mirror neuron sys-
tem4 (Garbarini, Adenzato, 2004; Wilson, 2002). 
3.1.1. Ecological approach to perception
The 3E’s underscore the importance of action in 
perception (an idea central to Schön’s epistemology) 
and how people incorporate items from the physical 
environment into their cognitive systems. Form and 
capabilities of a person’s body along with its inter-
actions with the external environment shape that 
person’s conception of the world (Wilson, 2002). This 
ecological view of cognition was popularized with 
psychologist J.J. Gibson’s (1977) Theory of Affordances. 
Gibson believed people understand the world in terms 
of functional relevance (affordances). Affordance is 
action opportunity constituted through the relationship 
between a person’s capabilities and features of the en-
vironment. The ecological view of perception suggests 
people are inherently goal-directed and wired for ac-
tion; they perceive their environments in terms of the 
action opportunities (field of affordances) they present. 
Figure 3 illustrates how a person’s action in the world 
changes the field of affordances available to him and, 
in turn, his field of affordances affects his perception.
3 - Two-stream 
hypothesis argues 
vision and hearing 
are each charac-
terized by distinct 
systems: ventral 
stream (’what path-










4 - A mirror neuron 
fires when a per-
son performs an 
action and when 




linkage in cognitive 
processing.
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3.1.2. Embodied knowing-in-action
Knowing-in-action describes the embodied, practical 
knowledge people exhibit through doing. It has the 
following properties (p. 54):
1 Actions, recognitions, and judgments are carried 
out spontaneously, without prior thought.
2 People are often unaware of having learned them.
3 They are usually unable to describe the knowing 
revealed in their actions.
Schön’s story of Quist, an architect, and Petra, his stu-
dent, illustrates how practitioners communicate em-
bodied-knowing through drawing. Petra has problems 
with a complex slope in her design for a school. Quist 
places tracing paper over her drawing, demonstrating 
design expertise through knowing-in-action while 
drawing. His sketches reveal knowledge, with words 
mainly referencing what he is doing:
Quist’s lines are unclear in their reference except insofar as 
he says what they mean. His words are obscure except inso-
far as Petra can connect them with the lines of the drawing. 
His talk is full of dychtic utterances – ‘here,’ ‘this,’ ‘that,’ –
which Petra can interpret only by his movements. (p. 81)
Quist is thinking by drawing. Drawing tools and paper 
are transparent equipment; he sees through them to 
externalize knowing-in-action (Clark, 2008). His body 
Fig. 3 - Perceiving- 
in-Action.
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helps constitute cognition through interactions with 
artifacts in the environment, in this case drawing 
instruments.
3.1.3. Embedded reflection-in-action
Reflection-in-action is an explicit process to remedy 
‘bad fit’; it is triggered by a surprise when intuitive 
performance yields unexpected results (Schön 1983, 
p. 56). Feedback from “materials of a situation” (p. 78) 
prompt the designer to “surface and criticize the tacit 
understandings” of the problem (p. 61). Quist relies 
upon his repertoire of experience to select one prob-
lematic aspect of Petra’s design: the relationship be-
tween L-shaped classroom and site slope. He reframes 
the problem, suggesting geometry (“discipline”) be 
imposed upon the “screwy” site (p. 85). Then he con-
ducts a frame experiment to test his idea by drawing 
plan and sections (pp. 86-87):
1. The L-shaped classrooms are carved into the slope as 
in sketch A [plan]. 
2. The ‘differentiation potential’ [of the site is 15’,] 
shown in the sectional sketch B… The slope is now divid-
ed into three levels, one for each of the classrooms…
3. [Section] C shows the ‘interval’ from the ground on 
one level to the roof of the classroom… on the next lower 
level [5’].
Quist uses different drawings as things to think with 
while testing his frame experiment: imposing ‘disci-
pline’ on the site. Each drawing reveals affordances 
explored in a subsequent drawing. In plan A, three 
L-shaped classroom buildings are arranged with re-
spect to site topography. Affordances of this organiza-
tion are investigated in section B, revealing a 15’ site 
drop (‘differentiation potential’) between classroom 
buildings at the top and bottom of the site. In section 
C, Quist examines affordances of stepping buildings 
in 5’ intervals. A new idea emerges: to provide ‘nooks’ 
for the children. 
Reflection-in-action describes embedded cognition. 
Quist off–loaded cognitive work to his drawings to in-
vestigate tacit assumptions and reveal unanticipated 
affordances. Manipulation of features and qualities of 
the problem environment is critical even for experts 
like Quist to understand complex situations through 
“incremental cognitive self–stimulation” sustained by 
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feedback from changing environmental conditions 
(Clark, 2008, p. 61). 
3.1.4. Artistry enacted through conversation with 
materials 
The enactive thesis describes how understanding is con-
stituted through (enacted by) people’s interactions with 
aspects of their environments. This concept aligns with 
embodied and embedded theories, because cognition 
that is embodied and embedded must also be enactive 
(Ward, Stapleton, 2012). Reflective practice describes a 
form of enactive cognition in that it focuses attention 
on the importance of action in ways practitioners intu-
itively manage complexity toward developing creative 
solutions to ill-defined problems (Malinin, 2016). Schön 
described this as artistry:
A designer makes things… Typically his making process 
is complex. There are more variables – kinds of possible 
moves, norms, and interrelationships of these – than can be 
represented in a finite model. Because of this complexity, 
the designer’s moves tend, happily or unhappily, to produce 
consequences other than those intended… He shapes the 
situation, in accordance with his initial appreciation of it, the 
situation ‘talks back,’ and he responds… (p. 79).
Artistry is transactional and improvisational per-
formance between designer and the product of his 
making, enacted by feedback from the materials of 
the design situation. He perceives-in-action as his 
idea takes form; shifting in stance he “must oscillate 
between involvement and detachment” (p. 102) in 
response to the conversation unfolding from the ma-
terials at his hand. 
3.2. Mind: A prediction machine
Predictive Mind theory also emphasizes the importance 
of action in perception (Clark, 2015). The argument here 
is that our expectations shape how we experience the 
world, determining what we attend to with our senso-
ry systems of sight, sound, smell, touch, and taste. The 
nervous system, it hypothesizes, is designed to adapt to 
uncertainty, providing real-time feedback from the en-
vironment to confirm or contradict expectations about 
it. The brain, wired to conserve resources, ‘surfaces 
uncertainty’ by comparing expectations to experiences, 
prioritizing attention where it is needed. Perceptions 
Reflective practice 
describes a form of 
enactive cognition 
in that it focuses 
attention on the 
importance of 








of the environment that confirm expectations are not 
given much importance. Instead, unexpected feedback 
(Schön’s ‘bad fit’) is prioritized, and sensory inputs 
improve accuracy of future predictions and behaviors. 
Attention and action are bound together as an effortful 
‘error detection’ system. Thus, sustained attention in 
the absence of action becomes harder because the mind 
craves new sensory information (Clark, 2015).
3.2.1. Knowing-in-practice: specialized prediction-sy-
stem
Knowing-in-practice is an intuitive, disciplinary-spe-
cific, ‘error detection’ process developed from pat-
terns of experiences in similar design cases. 
As a practitioner experiences many variations of a small 
number of types of cases… he learns what to look for and how 
to respond to what he finds. As long as his practice is stable, in 
the sense that it brings him the same types of cases, he becomes 
less and less subject to surprise. His knowing-in-practice [be-
comes] increasingly tacit, spontaneous, and automatic… (p. 60)
Quist’s problem-solving repertoire includes “sites he 
has seen, buildings he has known, design problems 
he has encountered, and solutions he has devised for 
them” (p. 138). He has acquired domain-specific tech-
nical expertise (for example, orthographic drawing) 
and developed domain design-language (e.g., pro-
gram, site, elements, form, structure, scale, precedent, 
representation, etc.) (p. 96). This repertoire structures 
‘priorities for attending to features of a situation’ 
(p. 98) and shapes affordances he perceives.
3.2.2. Reflective practice is situated design-thinking 
Schön’s concepts – knowing-in-action, reflection-in-ac-
tion, artistry, and knowing-in-practice – align with 
cognitive theories of embodied, embedded, and en-
active perception and predictive mind. This analysis, 
summarized in Table 1, suggests foundational princi-
ples underlying his constructs are valid and supported 
by research from the mind and brain science. In the 
next section, the analysis is used to evaluate criticisms 
regarding conceptual clarity, implementation, and 
socio-cultural context.
4. Limitations of Schön’s theory
Criticism of Schön’s reflective practice theory largely 
come from problems associated with applying it to 
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instructional practices in teacher preparation, nursing 
programs (Boud, Walker, 2002; Ekebergh, 2007) and ar-
chitectural education (Mewburn, 2012; Webster, 2008). 
These are reframed as three questions to consider:
• What distinguishes reflection-in-action from know-
ing-in-action and reflection-on-action?
• Is it possible to ‘reflect’ during intuitive activities?
• What role does socio-cultural context play in peo-
ple’s abilities to critically reflect ‘in’ and ‘on’ their 
actions?
4.1. Reflection problems: Construct and implementation
What distinguishes reflection-in-action from reflec-
tion-on-action?
At the root of this question is that Schön used ‘reflec-
tion’ to describe different cognitive processes. The 









Quist’s architectural knowledge is embodied and revealed 
through drawing processes. Words are obscure, with 
‘dychtic utterances’ referencing drawings. Drawing tools 





Quist uses drawings as things to think with. He selects 
one problematic design aspect and conducts a frame 
experiment. Predicting reorganized building forms will 
work better with the ‘screwy’ site, he tests this through 




Artistry Quist’s design emerges through ‘conversation with’ drawings. 
Each drawing reveals new affordances investigated in 
subsequent drawings. He shifts stance between immersion 
in drawing and detachment when perceiving unanticipated 
results. Iteratively he tests predictions, responding to 





Quist’s repertoire of experiences, skills, and design 
language develop through stable practice involving similar 
cases. This repertoire makes him less often surprised by 
situations and his practice becomes more tacit. It also 
helps him intuitively prioritize features of a design to 
attend to, shaping affordances he perceives. Knowing-in-
practice is a “self-reinforcing system” (p. 226) of prediction 
and error-detection.
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In the context 
of architectural 
practice reflection-
in-action would be 
fueled by feedback 
from abstracted 
representations of a 
design.
concept of ‘action present’ delineates reflection-in-ac-
tion from reflection-on-action. However, the former 
he described as appreciative (p. 101), promoting 
“recognition of implications” in a situation (p. 103). It 
is directed toward the object of design. The latter, he 
explained, is a self-reflexive process whereby practi-
tioners “can explore the [tacit] understandings they 
have brought to their handling of the case” (p. 61). 
Significantly, in the context of architectural practice 
reflection-in-action would be fueled by feedback 
from abstracted representations of a design (typically 
diagrams, drawings, and models) during the project 
phases of programming, schematic, development, and 
construction documents. Reflection-on-action, follow-
ing action-present (e.g., the project scope), would thus 
be promoted by unexpected outcomes of building use 
(e.g., from post-occupancy evaluation). This distinc-
tion between reflection-in-action and reflection-on is 
unclear, in part, because Schön used an educational 
setting to explain his concepts. 
What distinguishes reflection-in-action from know-
ing-in-action?
Schön also muddies the distinction between know-
ing-in-action and reflection in action. He describes 
different reflective processes during reflection-in-ac-
tion, calling them different stances: “involvement” 
and “detachment” (p. 102). Involvement refers to an 
intuitive process of “thinking on your feet” (p. 54), 
when people “find the groove” and have a “feel for” a 
situation, making “on-the-spot adjustments” to their 
performance (p. 55). Detachment is an explicit assess-
ment of a situation that “hinges on the experience of 
surprise” (p. 56). It is a way to rectify ‘bad fit’ by sur-
facing tacit understandings that may have led to the 
situation, and then developing new intentions (‘appre-
ciations’) toward it – often by reframing the problem. 
He fails to explain differences (if any) between the 
involvement stance of reflection-in-action and know-
ing-in-action – which he describes as intuitive know-
ing “implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel 
for the stuff with which we are dealing… (p. 49).
Is it possible to ‘reflect’ during intuitive activities?
Although he described both intuitive and explicit 
processes of reflection-in-action, Schön acknowledged 
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asserted, however, that this apparent contradiction 
is due to misunderstanding that thinking must be 
separate from doing–and because there are different 
types of reflection (involvement versus detachment). 
He failed to resolve this apparent conflict between 
intuitive doing and reflecting, stating that even if re-
flecting-while-doing is feasible, it could be dangerous 
(p. 277). He suggested instead that thinking and doing 
are complementary processes that build off of each 
other; “doing extends thinking in the tests, moves, and 
probes of experimental action, and reflection feeds on 
doing and its results” (p. 280). This explanation seems 
to contradict his examples of (involvement-stance) 
reflection during improvisational performances, such 
as while pitching a baseball or playing jazz (p. 55).
4.2. Evolving design-rationale problem: Socio-cultural 
context
What role does socio-cultural context play in abilities to 
critically reflect ‘in’ and ‘on’ actions?
Schön acknowledged designers bring different perspec-
tives to their designs through implicit “values, goals, 
purposes, and interests” (p. 17). He suggested feedback 
from actions promotes opportunities to surface and 
challenge tacit assumptions by reflecting ‘in’ and ‘on’ 
action. Designers’ abilities to perceive affordances for 
reflection, however, are limited by their learned bodily 
behaviors (e.g., skills/training), domain knowledge, 
norms of practice, and shared organizational expec-
tations. Schön considered the role of organizational 
structures in promoting or inhibiting reflection (p. 242), 
but neglected to consider how organizational culture 
shapes perception and ways people resist, violate, or 
transform shared expectations of their design firm or 
general field of practice (Webster, 2008).
5. Extending Schön’s epistemology 
Although Schön captured the physically-situated na-
ture of design-thinking, he left the concept of reflection 
vague–perhaps intentionally so, since his purpose was 
to free design from the limits of technical rationality. 
For a more complete epistemology of architectural 
practice, the limitations discussed in the prior section 
must be addressed. To that end, a conceptual frame-
work is proposed here that extends Schön’s theory in 
two ways:
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1. It proposes clearer definitions for different forms 
of reflection, by illustrating cognitive processes 
involved.
2. It suggests how to incorporate socio-cultural con-
texts of reflection within its purpose for evolving 
design-rationale and organizational transforma-
tion.
5.1. Reflection to evolve creativity
You stop thinking,  
you just look at the piece of foam and you try to make it 
beautiful,  
you cut.  
Sometimes you slice something,  
and then another thing,  
 
and ou-u-u-p-p-p something is there.  
And you think: 
“Oh, that’s interesting;” it’s there. (Yaneva, 2009, p. 57)
This quote from Yaneva’s (2009) study of the Office for 
Metropolitan Architecture (OMA) serves to illustrate 
how Schön’s concepts of knowing-in-action and reflec-
tion-in-action might be clarified to more accurately 
represent design cognition during action-present., In it 
Olga, an architect, explains how she comes up with ‘a 
smart idea.’ She describes involvement (first part) and 
detachment (second part) stances similar to Schön’s 
reflection-in-action. However, Olga does not stop-and-
think when cutting the foam to reflect on each outcome 
of an action; instead she ‘stop(s) thinking.’ Each cut 
is intuitively confirmed to align with her intentions 
until she realizes ‘a bad fit’ and is happily surprised by 
the outcome. Surprise gives her pause to assess (think 
about) the opportunities in this unexpected outcome. 
Before her moment of surprise, Olga is perceiv-
ing-in-action, a process of tacit error-detection. Her 
knowing is in her actions and she perceives by doing. 
The ‘involvement’ Olga describes sounds like Schön’s 
knowing-in-action; she intuitively knows what is 
good (predicted) and what is ‘bad fit’ (unpredicted). 
Each action is guided by prior embodied, foam-cut-
ting experiences and perceived affordances shaped 
by prior practice, personal values, and the workplace 
socio-cultural environment (Fig. 4).
Olga’s creativity evolves through action, intuitive-
ly “recogniz[ing] bad fit within a familiar pattern” 
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(Schön 1983, pp. 52-53). She describes this feeling 
(ou-u-u-p-p-p something is there), which triggers a 
semi-detached stance (And you think) for reflect-
ing-in-action (“Oh, that’s interesting;” it’s there). Ol-
ga’s reflection is valuative and situated in action; she 
might rotate the foam to help perceive opportunities 
in the model. She becomes aware of her thinking (it 
is explicit). Yet valuation remains guided by intuitive 
knowledge embedded in the foam (it’s there). This is 
not critical reflection; Olga may ignore some prob-
lematic features or personal assumptions in order to 
help identify unforeseen affordances in the design.
When analyzed with respect to knowledge from cog-
nitive science, examples of architectural practice like 
Olga’s and Quist’s help clarify Schön’s knowing-in-ac-
tion and reflection-in-action constructs. Theoretical 
perspectives of enactive cognition and predictive 
mind suggest Olga is predictively-perceiving-in-ac-
tion when involved in foam-cutting; she anticipates 
the outcomes of each action during her performance. 
Schön’s ‘involvement’ stance, therefore, may more 
accurately describe knowing-in-action than reflec-
tion-in-action, because it appears guided by intuitive 
prediction/error-detection processes as opposed to 
reflection. Reflection-in-action is conceptually clear-
er when limited to the (semi) ‘detached’ stance and 
explicit process of valuative reflection. In practice 
Fig. 4 - Knowing-in-







objects in the envi-
ronment.
69Laura Malinin
these two complementary processes often appear 
intertwined (e.g., Quist’s artistry example in Table 1), 
particularly as professionals develop artistry, exper-
tise in evolving creative exploration by moving fluid-
ly between involvement and detachment (Fig. 5). 
5.2. Reflection to evolve design-rationale and practice
Schön claimed practitioners acquire expertise by 
evolving design-rationale through reflection on-ac-
tion and on-practice. Reflection-on-action helps a 
practitioner develop specialization–the ability to 
more accurately predict outcomes of intuitive actions. 
Reflection-on-practice, however, is crucial for avoid-
ing the pitfalls of specialization: narrow vision and 
replicating patterns of error (ivi, pp. 60-61). Despite 
arguing their importance, Schön gave little attention 
to how these processes are promoted in professional 
practice or what factors they involve. Given what 
we know about how learning is socially (as well as 
physically) situated, the importance of organizational 
and disciplinary culture should be accounted for in 
epistemology of architectural practice. 
First, the role of critique must be considered with 
respect to project team and firm (design business). 
Critique is central to evolving design-rationale be-
cause reasoned opinions of other people about design 
products or actions can trigger reflection-in-action or 
reflection-on-action (Fischer et al., 1993). Schön simpli-
fied the critique interactions between Quist and Petra, 
focusing on Quist’s role as expert in modeling reflec-
tive practice. Schön’s critics argue he ignored power 
dynamics, warning that Quist imposes his values and 
Fig. 5 - Artistry. 
Design professionals 
fluidly move between 
the complemen-
tary processes of 
knowing-in-action 
and refection-in-
action to evolve 
creativity through in-
tuitive experimenta-








opinions of other 
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design products or 
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firm culture and 
design-rationale, 




of the profession 
and the citizen 
architect.




with blue foam is 




to ‘think’ without 
it during ‘no-foam 
month’. 
design philosophy when mentoring Petra (Mewburn, 
2012; Webster, 2008). Similar power dynamics occur 
in professional teams, where interns might work in 
collaboration with licensed project architects or firm 
partners. Further, Mewburn (2012) points out Schön 
ignored instances when Petra questioned Quist’s meth-
odologies. In so doing, Schön missed an opportunity to 
explore how feedback from others (including novices) 
can help experts overcome pitfalls of specialization by 
engendering reflection.5 Professional design practice is 
situated in the socio-physical context of a firm, which 
affects employee’s values and philosophies along with 
available tools, materials, and methodologies they use 
to think-in-action6. The design team typically includes 
members from inside and outside the firm, includ-
ing allied professionals (engineers and contractors) 
and building stakeholders holding different values, 
philosophies, skills, and methodologies. Feedback from 
various forms of critique (e.g., novice, expert, cross-dis-
ciplinary) and methods of ideation/visualization (e.g., 
diagrams, drawings, models, etc.) help professionals 
evolve design-rationale, such as by recognizing tacit 
repetition of ineffective or problematic design patterns.
Second, the role of feedback from implementation and 
use is essential for a more complete epistemology of ar-
chitectural practice. Schön’s example of reflective prac-
tice involved the architectural studio where students 
worked on simulated projects that were never built or 
used by occupants. Direct feedback from design use is 
necessary for making salient to the designer unexpected 
outcomes of the postmortem design project, triggering 
reflection-on-action (McCall, 2013). Critical reflexivity 
helps the designer evolve design-rationale by surfac-
ing underlying assumptions, reframing problems, and 
developing new theories of action that may be applied to 
future design situations. Without feedback from build-
ing use there is often insufficient stimulus to effectively 
promote critical reflexivity (Malinin,Cunningham, 2014). 
This suggests the ability to evolve design-rationale rests 
heavily on effectiveness of post-occupancy evaluation 
(POE) processes to elucidate expected and unexpected 
outcomes of a building design. Firm organizational 
culture, however, determines if and how POE’s are con-
ducted, including what information might be considered 
valuable and whether affordances revealed by POE’s are 
perceived or actualized to evolve design-rationale.
Professional design 
practice is situated 
in the socio-physical 
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tools, materials, 
and methodologies 
they use to think-in-
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Finally, a more complete epistemology must consider 
how architectural practice evolves within the firm 
and discipline as a whole. Certainly critique and 
POE processes play a role, however these typically 
evoke incremental changes. If we consider ‘cultures 
of practice’ are shaped by domain knowledge/skills 
and organizational norms, methods, and procedures, 
then reflection-on-practice might best be promot-
ed through feedback from outside that culture. For 
example, transformational practices like Universal 
Design or Biomimicry are responses to disruptive 
pressures from outside the field to prioritize acces-
sibility and sustainability in architectural solutions. 
Disruptive technologies are also common triggers for 
reflection-on-practice; they may help curtail unpro-
ductive group-think arising through shared know-
ing-in-practice, inviting organizational transforma-
tion (Malinin et al., 2016). For example, building 
information model (BIM), 3d printing, virtual and 
augmented reality (VR/AR) are a few technologies 
impacting design practices today. Paradigm shifts are 
often caused by external disruptions that challenge 
assumptions, methodologies, or philosophies within 
a community of practice (Crilly, 2010; Kuhn, 1996). 
Disruptions trigger reflection-on-practice by inciting 
practitioners to re-examine previously established 
disciplinary knowledge. After a period of resistance 
(or critique), disruptive pressures may ultimately 
yield transformation of disciplinary values, philoso-
phies and methodologies.
The central theme underlying reflective practice con-
structs is the importance of feedback – from materials 
(e.g., products, tools, and technologies) and critique – 
in promoting reflection, helping the designer ‘sur-
face uncertainty’ to evolve thinking about complex 
problems. 
• For knowing-in-action, feedback confirms in-
tentions (predictions), helping the practitioner 
maintain attention by responding to new sensory 
information in the situation. 
• Reflection-in-action relies on the designers’ percep-
tion of unexpected feedback from actions to detect 
and remedy ‘bad fit’
• Reflection-on-action hinges on feedback from im-
plementation and use (i.e., critique external to the 
The role of 
feedback from 
implementation 
and use is 
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firm) to stimulate critical reflexivity and evolve 
design-rationale.
• Reflection-on-practice is triggered by external 
disruptions to established assumptions, method-
ologies, values or philosophies within a practice 
community and promotes new paradigms. 
Figure 6 provides a conceptual sketch, extending 
Schön’s epistemology of practice with the ideas pro-
posed in this section, as a step toward defining a more 
complete picture of how design-thinking knowledge 
is constructed and evolved through architectural 
practice.
6. Conclusion
In the 1980’s Schön examined designers’ lived expe-
riences, describing how they exploit affordances in 
their environments when thinking-in-action to extend 
cognitive abilities. His epistemology of practice grant-
ed credibility to experience and intuitive know-how 
(artistry) – and introduced concepts foundational to 
modern theories of embodied, embedded, and enac-
tive cognition. He explained how designers overcome 
their natural tendency to fall into patterns of predic-
tion, employing design-thinking to ‘surface uncertain-
ty’ and perceive unforeseen affordances in problemat-
ic situations. Although incomplete, reflective practice 
theory provides a solid foundation upon which to 
build a more complete epistemology of architectural 




practice. It underscores how architects rely on tech-
nologies (non-humans), to promote reflection, thereby 
improving capabilities for managing complexities of 
design practice and challenging tacit understandings 
in ill-defined situations. By extending Schön’s theory 
we may compose a more complete picture of architec-
tural practice, lending legitimacy to it methodologies 
and the creative value it brings toward solving com-
plex societal problems.
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